

## AEGINETAN MEMBERSHIP IN THE PELOPONNESIAN LEAGUE

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MODERN studies of Greece in the fifth century have been largely absorbed in an investigation of the foreign policies of Athens and Sparta, and in the relations of other states with these two great powers. Thus, it comes as no surprise that interest in Aegina's foreign policy has emphasized the question of whether this island belonged to the Peloponnesian or Delian Leagues in the fifth century. The nearly unanimous opinion, usually taken for granted rather than specifically argued, is that Aegina had become a member of the Peloponnesian League by, at the latest, the first decade of the fifth century.<sup>1</sup> The reasons for this determination are often unstated and so can only be subject to speculation. In part, this interpretation may spring from an approach to Greek foreign affairs that focuses on the racial or ethnic character of the states involved. As Sparta, the greatest of the Dorian states, offered an ideological counterpart to Ionian Athens, the Aeginetan Dorians, or as has been suggested, Dorian Vorkämpfer of the Athenians, must have thrown in their lot with Sparta.<sup>2</sup> For example, G. E. M. de Ste. Croix emphasizes that Aegina was Dorian, and an aristocratic oligarchy, and thus had every reason to align herself with Dorian and oligarchic Sparta against Athens.<sup>3</sup> Despite speaking the Dorian dialect, the Aeginetans put greater emphasis on the Achaeaeon Aeacids as their forebears, if Pindar's Aeginetan odes are any indication.<sup>4</sup> Given the probable gross social dissimilarities between the two states, to say Aegina and Sparta were both oligarchies is to say nothing more than that they were not Athenian-style democracies. We are left with the question of why hostility to Athens should draw Aegina closer to Sparta in a period when Sparta was hardly Athens' consistent opponent.

1. E.g., F. E. Adcock, "Athens under the Tyrants," *CAH*, vol. 4 (Cambridge, 1923), p. 73; H. Bengtson, *Griechische Geschichte*<sup>4</sup> (Munich, 1969), p. 132; G. Glotz and R. Cohen, *Histoire grecque*, vol. 1 (Paris, 1926), pp. 374–75; R. Meiggs, *The Athenian Empire* (Oxford, 1970), p. 183; B. D. Meritt, H. T. Wade-Gery, and M. F. McGregor, *The Athenian Tribute Lists*, vol. 3 (Princeton, 1950), p. 197; E. M. Walker, "Athens: The Reform of Cleisthenes," *CAH* (Cambridge, 1923), p. 160; G. Welter, *Aigina*<sup>2</sup> (Athens, 1962), p. 11. An exception is K. Wickert, *Der peloponnesische Bund von seiner Entstehung bis zum Ende des archidamischen Krieges* (Königsberg, 1961), pp. 23–26. There have been two specific studies on the subject: D. M. Leahy, "Aegina and the Peloponnesian League," *CP* 49 (1954): 232–43; D. M. MacDowell, "Aegina and the Delian League," *JHS* 80 (1960): 118–21; but few have adopted a position on the strength of their arguments.

2. The notion that the racial background was crucial for the political history of the Peloponnesus goes back to C. O. Müller, *Die Dorier*<sup>2</sup>, vol. 1 (Breslau, 1844), pp. 161–220; idem, *Liber Aegineticorum* (Berlin, 1817), pp. 144–48. For the ethnic argument, especially on the opposition to Athens, see E. Kirsten, "Aigina," *Gnomon* 18 (1942): 289–311, esp. 301–2. Cf. E. Will, *Doriens et Ionians* (Paris, 1956), esp. pp. 11–16.

3. G. E. M. de Ste. Croix, *The Origins of the Peloponnesian War* (Cambridge, 1972), p. 334.

4. E.g., Pind. *Nem.* 3. 28–66, 4. 45–69, *Ol.* 8. 30–52, *Pyth.* 8. 98–100.

The notion of Aeginetan membership in the Peloponnesian League takes substance from the prevailing interpretation of the intervention of the Spartan king Cleomenes in Aeginetan affairs recorded in Herodotus Book 6.<sup>5</sup> The legal grounds for the taking of hostages to insure Aeginetan quiescence pending the arrival of the Persian expeditionary force under Datis have been said to have been Sparta's responsibilities as Aegina's *hegemon*.<sup>6</sup> As we shall see, however, Herodotus' account of this episode is far from being so transparent. In any case, such an unusual episode should not be made to bear the decisive burden of proof on either side of this issue.

The paucity of the evidence both precludes a definitive conclusion and necessitates much of the argument's being *ex silentio*. Nevertheless, silences in our sources, where Aegina as an ally of Sparta could be expected to appear, are obviously not without significance. Indeed, in none of our sources is there anything remotely resembling a direct statement that Aegina was a member of the Peloponnesian League. All such conclusions are strictly inferential.

#### I. AEGINETAN FOREIGN RELATIONS BEFORE 550

Although there has been no clear suggestion that Aegina could have been an ally of Sparta before 550, the direction of Aeginetan overseas connections deserves emphasis. Aegina is linked with and influenced by Argos and the Argolid in this period rather than by Sparta. Therefore, it falls to those who would maintain that Aegina joined the Peloponnesian League sometime after the mid-sixth century to indicate when, how, and why the Aeginetan change in policy took place.

The evidence of mythology points toward an association between Aegina and Argos. The Dorian settlers of Aegina were either directly from Argos, or from Argos with Epidaurus as intermediary.<sup>7</sup> The Epidaurian role as direct colonizer suggests that the historical rivalry between Epidaurus and Argos over Aegina, a sometime dependency of Epidaurus, has left its mark on the tradition.<sup>8</sup> Aegina belonged to the Temenid inheritance—those states originally allotted to Argos at the Heraclid return.<sup>9</sup> It strains belief that the resettlement of the Peloponnesus by Dorian bands in the Dark Ages took this highly developed form, or so legalistic a framework, or that such events were remembered. Rather, Argos' growing strength from the eighth century, making possible territorial aggression, gives a practical upper limit for a formulation of the inheritance. The sources do not equip us to evaluate how far these Argive claims to predominance over Aegina were translated into reality.<sup>10</sup> Nevertheless, the Temenid inheritance's emphasis on the inherent sovereignty of Argos' hereditary kings could only

5. Hdt. 6. 50–51, 73. See, e.g., U. Kahrstedt, *Griechisches Staatsrecht*, vol. 1 (Göttingen, 1922), p. 28; De Ste. Croix, *Origins*, p. 334.

6. Leahy, "Aegina and the Peloponnesian League," pp. 238–40.

7. Schol. Pind. *Ol.* 8. 39b; J. Tzetzes *Lyc.* 176; Paus. 2. 29. 5; Hdt. 8. 46. 1.

8. Hdt. 5. 83. 1. On Epidaurus and Sparta, see Wickert, *Der peloponnesische Bund*, pp. 60–61.

9. Strabo 8. 3. 33.

10. On Argos in this period, see R. A. Tomlinson, *Argos and the Argolid* (Ithaca, 1972), pp. 67–87; T. Kelly, *A History of Argos down to 500 B.C.* (Minneapolis, 1977), pp. 51–72.

have been formulated before the end of the monarchy, at the latest in the early sixth century.

Pheidon (who is to be dated in the first half of the seventh century) had the greatest impact of the Argive kings on collective memory, and is credited with the recovery of the lot of Temenos. He is connected with Aegina by a tradition that he minted silver on the island.<sup>11</sup> It is debatable whether Pheidon can be downdated on the basis of Herodotus in order to save this tradition in the face of lowered dates for the beginning of Aeginetan coinage.<sup>12</sup> Even if one adopts the extreme position that this tradition was pure fiction, he must recognize that its authors not only held it to be possible, but perhaps even expected to place Aegina in the Argive sphere of influence in the Archaic Period.

Other scattered bits of evidence, though not in themselves of great consequence, fail to point toward Sparta. First of all, Aegina was a member of the Calaurian Amphictyony, centered on the temple of Poseidon at Calauria near Troezen.<sup>13</sup> Argos took up membership by taking Nauplia's place by ca. 600, but the influence of Sparta seems later, not until the 540s, when she replaced Prasiae by conquest.<sup>14</sup> Also, the sources for early Peloponnesian history, and particularly for the Messenian Wars, for which Pausanias is our chief intermediate source, do not connect Aegina with Sparta, although allies of both the Spartans and the Messenians make their appearance from as far away as the Isthmian states, and even from Samos.<sup>15</sup> Moreover, the allies attributed to each side reflect the alignments of the late fifth and early fourth centuries, in the light of which Aeginetan absence from the account is striking, given her close relationship with Sparta in this later period. Aegina makes her only appearance in early Peloponnesian history, as reported by Pausanias, in an anecdote in which Aeginetan merchants are described as penetrating Arcadia through Cyllene, the port of Elis.<sup>16</sup> Both Arcadia and Elis are said to have been hostile to Sparta in the early Archaic Period.

11. On Pheidon, see A. Andrewes, *The Greek Tyrants* (London, 1956), pp. 3-42. On minting, see Ephorus *FGH* 70 F 115, F 176; *Mar. Par.* Z 46 Jacoby; *Etym. Mag.*, s.v. *ᾠφελισκος*.

12. A. Andrewes, "The Corinthian Actaeon and Pheidon of Argos," *CQ* 43 (1949): 70-75, persuasively argues for a seventh-century date for Pheidon. The trend on the beginnings of Aeginetan coinage has been to downdate. See W. L. Brown, "Pheidon's Alleged Aeginetan Coinage," *NC* ser. 6, 10 (1950): 177-203 (after 610); R. R. Holloway, "An Archaic Hoard from Crete," *ANSMuN* 17 (1971): 1-23 (580-70); C. M. Kraay, *Archaic and Classical Greek Coins* (Berkeley, 1976), pp. 41-49 (after ca. 600); M. Price and N. Waggoner, *Archaic Greek Coinage: The Asyut Hoard* (Manchester and London, 1975), pp. 68-76 (550-40).

13. Strabo 8. 6. 14. For a date, see T. Kelly, "The Calaurian Amphictyony," *AJA* 70 (1966): 113-21.

14. On Argos, see L. H. Jeffery, *Archaic Greece: The City-States c. 700-500 B.C.* (London, 1976), pp. 138-39. On Sparta: Hdt. 1. 82. 1-3.

15. Paus. 4. 11. 1, 4. 15. 7-8. On Samos, see Hdt. 3. 47. 1.

16. Paus. 8. 5. 8. This episode is put two generations before a Spartan invasion of Tegea by King Charilaos. This story, ending as it does with a Spartan defeat and the imprisonment of Spartan captives, may be a doublet retrojecting the hostility between Sparta and Tegea of the early sixth century. In Pausanias, the war with Tegea is put two generations before the Messenian War. Welter, *Aigina*, p. 51, places the episode in ca. 750. The account of the Aeginetan trading voyages appears built around an etymology of the name of an Arcadian king, Aiginetes, which seriously undercuts its credibility.

The early conflict between Athens and Aegina, which created the *ἐχθρὴ παλαιή* between the two states, is perhaps pertinent.<sup>17</sup> Aegina is described as a dependency of Epidaurus, and her independence from that state, which is implicitly said to have preceded the war by a short period, seems to lie between ca. 615–595.<sup>18</sup> It is Argos that is the recipient of the Aeginetan appeal for help. Again, while we can minimize the historical value of this story, an extreme and perhaps unjustifiable measure, it is noteworthy that the ties between Argos and Aegina receive emphasis.

## II. AEGINA FROM 550 to 480 B.C.

First of all, it is appropriate to analyze the data which we have on Aegina in order to see if any alliance with Sparta can be drawn from it. Then, we might examine the evolution of the Peloponnesian League to discover if there is a point at which the accession of Aegina to the League seems most natural.

### *Sparta and the Samians*

In 525, the Spartans, with the support of at least Corinth among their allies, directed an expedition against Polycrates, the tyrant of Samos, in order to restore to power a group of aristocratic exiles.<sup>19</sup> The Spartans' real motivation may have been something other than pique over two Samian thefts.<sup>20</sup> After the failure of the expedition, the Samian aristocrats, having indulged in a piratical foray against Siphnos, bought the island of Hydra from the Hermionians, and left it in the care of the Troezenians. They then established themselves at Cydonia. The prospect of an eventual foundation by the Samians of a trading station or a piratical base at Hydra, so near their home, should not have been welcomed by the Aeginetans. Moreover, because Cydonia dominated the sea route to Egypt around the western end of Crete, the settlement there was regarded as threatening by the Aeginetans, who ejected the Samians from the island in the sixth year after their arrival.<sup>21</sup> Thus, we have the Samian aristocrats, Spartan protégés, acting provocatively toward the Aeginetans, presumably Sparta's allies, and the latter reacting with violence. Though not impossible given the lapse in time between the expedition against Polycrates and the ejection of the Samians from Cydonia, this scenario is certainly disturbing. It raises questions about Sparta's policy and her relations with her allies in this period that the alternative (that Aegina did not belong to the Peloponnesian League) does not.

17. Hdt. 5. 82–88.

18. T. J. Figueira, "Aegina and Athens in the Archaic and Classical Periods—a Socio-Political Investigation" (Diss., University of Pennsylvania, 1977), pp. 216–26.

19. Hdt. 3. 47. 1.

20. If the Spartans had more serious motives for their move against Polycrates, the incongruity indicated in the text is heightened. Herodotus (3. 47. 1–49. 2) recorded discrepant Spartan and Samian traditions about the reasons for the intervention, and was uneasy about the preserved tradition concerning Corinth's involvement. Plutarch (*Mor.* 859C–D) points out several weaknesses in Herodotus' account, and the nearly contemporary expulsion of Lygdamis of Naxos may point to a more complex causation for the expedition.

21. Hdt. 3. 44. 1, 57. 1–59. 3.

*Athens and Aegina, 511–506*

When the Peisistratids were overthrown in Athens, several of Athens' neighbors reacted belligerently.<sup>22</sup> The hostilities embarked upon by Thebes, her Boeotian allies, and Chalcis were eventually to embroil Aegina.<sup>23</sup> Simultaneously, there were changes in attitude toward Athens on the part of Cleomenes and the Spartan government, perhaps consequent to the constitutional changes proposed by Cleisthenes, or to the embassy dispatched to Persia. It is noteworthy that Athenian warfare with neighboring states does not seem to have been integrally involved with Spartan efforts to put Isagoras and then Hippias in control at Athens. In the first place, we have no way of knowing whether warfare with Thebes preceded Spartan disenchantment. Theban hostility toward Athens lay in the Athenian alliance with Plataea. If the Plataean appeal to Athens at Cleomenes' urging is redated from 519 to 509,<sup>24</sup> the war between Thebes and Athens would have just preceded the Spartan change of heart toward Athens (i.e., anxiety over Cleisthenes). The emendation explains several details of the Plataean alliance story: Cleomenes received the Plataean appeal north of the Isthmus because he had just expelled Hippias; the Corinthians were at hand (in the Peloponnesian army) to arbitrate between Athens and Thebes; the Plataeans need no longer be thought of as appealing from the *dunasteia* of Thebes to tyrannical Athens. Cleomenes allied Plataea with Athens, so strengthening both, during the brief time when he trusted Athens, that is, between his expulsion of Hippias and his disenchantment with Cleisthenes. The desire to embroil Thebes with Athens, attributed to Cleomenes by Herodotus,<sup>25</sup> is anachronistic, as it takes as its viewpoint Spartan-Athenian relations of the period after Cleomenes' abortive interventions.

The Thebes-Chalcis-Aegina alliance is grounded in the realities of local politics, while the Spartan moves against Athens are Hellenic in scope, either seeking to seal off the Peloponnesus from influences disruptive to Spartan hegemony, and/or removing a potential Persian bridgehead in Europe. Thus, it is not surprising that the only sign of cooperation between the Spartans and Athens' local enemies is the Theban-Chalcidian attack on Attica *ἀπὸ συνθήματος*.<sup>26</sup> The *σύνθημα* was probably an ad hoc agreement for this campaign by the Spartans with two nonallies, as Herodotus' usage of the word suggests.<sup>27</sup>

After Cleomenes' attempt to put Isagoras in power, there is no mention of the Thebans or Aeginetans. The Aeginetan devastation of the Attic

22. Hdt. 5. 74. 2.

23. Hdt. 5. 79. 1–80. 3.

24. Hdt. 6. 108; Thuc. 3. 68. 5. The emendation, moving the date from 519 (the present reading in Thucydides' text) to 509, goes back to G. Grote, *A History of Greece*, vol. 3 (London, 1888), pp. 383–84; cf. W. W. How and J. Wells, *A Commentary on Herodotus*, vol. 2 (Oxford, 1912), pp. 109–10. M. Amit, "L'alliance entre Athènes et Platées," *AC* 39 (1970): 414–26, opts for the year 509.

25. Hdt. 6. 108. 3.

26. Hdt. 5. 74. 2.

27. Wickert, *Der peloponnesische Bund*, p. 25. A similar phrase, *ἐκ συνθήματος* (Hdt. 6. 121. 1), is used for the compact of the Alcmaeonids with the Persians to give the shield signal after Marathon. In Herodotus, *sunthema* carries meanings from "watchword" (e.g., 9. 98. 3) to these passages, where it must mean something like "prior agreement."

coasts, apparently their chief contribution to the effort against Athens, was a military technique essentially unsuited to Spartan needs.<sup>28</sup> Cleomenes' eventual espousal of Hippias' restoration may suggest that the king had come to realize that, without greater internal support (an addition of the remaining partisans of the Peisistratids to the faction of Isagoras), no narrowly-based government could hope to survive at Athens. In the face of Cleisthenes' championing of the demos, Isagoras had shown himself too weak to maintain himself on the strength of his own followers. Cleomenes wanted to expel the Alcmaeonids and other antioligarchic families by a show of force. Aeginetan military activity, rather than awing the Athenians into compliance, could only have the counterproductive effect that it did, namely, to exacerbate the Athenians to the point of insisting on an attack against Aegina.<sup>29</sup> Surely, Sparta would have urged a military policy on Aegina more in tune with her own goals, if she had been in a position to do so as Aegina's *hegemon*.

The above interpretation is borne out by the indifference of the Spartans to the precarious situation of the anti-Athenian coalition created by their withdrawal. Both Thebes and Chalcis were defeated, with the result in the case of Chalcis that Athenian settlers were established on the lands of the town's evicted aristocrats, and in the case of Thebes, that the independence of Plataea was vindicated. There is no reason to doubt that similar punishment would have been meted out to the Aeginetans had it been in the power of the Athenians to do so. The Delphic response given to the Athenians inquiring what steps to take against the Aeginetans was to establish a precinct for Aeacus. This must mean that Athens hoped to achieve rightful ownership of the island by appropriating its leading hero.<sup>30</sup>

The war which the Aeginetans had started at the urging of Thebes is described by Herodotus as a πόλεμος ἀκήρυκτος, which ought to mean that it lay outside the conventions of Greek warfare.<sup>31</sup> This seems to be out of character with the Spartan interventions against Athens, which are marked by no deviations from normal military practice, as far as we are informed.

The conflict continued after Sparta desisted from meddling in Athens' internal affairs. There is something perverse in a point of view which would see Aegina belonging to the Peloponnesian League throughout the period when the island was at war with Athens. What is an alliance (*summachia*) but a commitment to help another state against an enemy?<sup>32</sup> Yet Athens

28. Hdt. 5. 81. 3, 89. 1.

29. Hdt. 5. 89. 3.

30. Hdt. 5. 89. 1-2. On the analogy of the Salaminioi, *IG*, 2<sup>2</sup>. 1232.

31. Literally, "heraldless," this term takes on a meaning that approaches "relentless" (cf. Xen. *Anab.* 3. 35; Dem. 18. 262; Cass. Dio 1. 7). See A. Andrewes, "Athens and Aegina, 510-480 B.C.," *BSA* 37 (1936-37): 1-2.

32. The concept is embodied in such phrases as . . . ὥστε τὸν αὐτὸν ἐχθρὸν εἶναι καὶ φίλον . . . (*Ath. Pol.* 23. 5 on the Delian League); . . . ὥστε τοὺς αὐτοὺς ἐχθροὺς καὶ φίλους νομίζειν . . . (Thuc. 1. 44. 1). See J. A. O. Larsen, "The Constitution of the Peloponnesian League," *CP* 38 (1933): 273-74. The charges of the Corinthian speaker in Thuc. 1. 68. 2 do not provide a true parallel, inasmuch as their basis can only be in the confrontation between Athens and Corinth over Corcyra. The Spartans do not simply leave the Corinthians in the lurch, but attempt to help them and Corcyra to a mutually satisfactory resolution of the dispute (Thuc. 1. 28. 1). When the Corinthians remained adamant in their agitation, they were instrumental in motivating the eventual Spartan decision to go to war with Athens (De Ste. Croix, *Origins*, pp. 66-69).

was prepared to embark upon active hostility against Aegina seemingly without fear of reprisal from the Peloponnesian League. Herodotus breaks off his narrative of Athenian-Aeginetan relations, so that we cannot know what turns this confrontation may have taken in the 490s. But the Aeginetan decision to Medize in 491 indicates that no firm reconciliation had taken place.

### *The Sepeia Campaign*

The next occasion which was to involve the Aeginetans and the Spartans was Cleomenes' campaign against Argos that ended with the Spartan victory at Sepeia, usually dated to 494.<sup>33</sup> Cleomenes, thwarted in his initial invasion of the Argolid, made an approach by sea. Later, when Aegina approached Argos for aid against Athens, the Argives refused, because the Aeginetans had participated with their ships in the Sepeia campaign. Argos fined both Aegina and Sicyon, whose ships had been used, five hundred talents each.<sup>34</sup> The fine suggests that some residual Argive claim to hegemony over Aegina and Sicyon existed. The traditional view that this hegemony goes back to a period of Argive dominance in the northeast Peloponnesus (perhaps during the late eighth or early seventh century) does not appear unreasonable.<sup>35</sup>

Sicyon paid her fine, which suggests that, although by this time a member of the Peloponnesian League, she felt it politic to assuage Argive resentment.<sup>36</sup> The Aeginetans refused to pay, and stated that the ships had been taken by coercion. This must suggest something other than the normal provision of ships by a member of the Peloponnesian League to Sparta, as *ananke*, the term employed by Herodotus here, would be an extraordinary way to refer to such duties.<sup>37</sup> Moreover, the Sicyonians, who undoubtedly furnished ships in this way, do not try to excuse themselves in the same fashion, as far as we know. Herodotus puts the remark that the Aeginetan ships were taken under compulsion in the mouth of the Argives, which may

33. Hdt. 6. 77–82. The later date, which I accept, depends on an interpretation of the joint oracle given to Argos and Miletus (Hdt. 6. 77), which suggests a date in the mid 490s. See K. J. Beloch, *Griechische Geschichte*<sup>2</sup>, vol. 1 (Strassburg, 1912–16), p. 349; G. Busolt, *Griechische Geschichte*<sup>2</sup> (Gotha, 1893–95), pp. 561–65; Grote, *History of Greece*, 4:320.

34. Hdt. 6. 92. 1–2.

35. C. O. Müller, *Die Dorier*, 1:154. See also W. S. Barrett, "Bacchylides, Asine, and Apollo Pythaieus," *Hermes* 82 (1954): 121–44.

36. On Sicyonian membership in the Peloponnesian League, see Kahrstedt, *Griechisches Staatsrecht*, 1:28; Wickert, *Der peloponnesische Bund*, pp. 18–19. That the Sicyonians were ready to hand over to Argos a sum of money of this magnitude, 100 T in the final settlement, suggests a real fear of Argive retaliation. In the normal balance of military power in the Peloponnesus, and especially after Sepeia, it is hard to visualize why this fear should have been so intense. Perhaps it was Persia (and Argive overtures to Persia) that provided the impetus for this anxiety on the part of the Sicyonians.

37. J. E. Powell, *Lexicon to Herodotus* (Oxford, 1938), s.v. ἀνάγκη, translates *ananke* as "by force or compulsion" in this passage. Parallel is 6. 25. 2, where, after the fall of Miletus, the Persians regain control of a group of Carian cities by the application or threat of force. "Coercion" is to be preferred in 7. 172. 3, where the Thessalians warn the Hellenic League of the uselessness of coercing them if the League refuses to help; also, 7. 136. 1, where the bodyguards of Xerxes attempt to coerce the Spartan ambassadors to offer *proskynesis*. See MacDowell, "Aegina and the Delian League," p. 118, esp. n. 8. De Ste. Croix, *Origins*, p. 334, however, justifiably rebuffs MacDowell's suggestion that *ananke* must mean that the Aeginetan ships were seized in wartime. Had Herodotus meant to stress that physical force was brought to bear, he would perhaps have used βίη (cf. 6. 5. 2, 9. 76. 2).

imply that the truth of this was accepted by them. Therefore, the core of the charge against the Aeginetans would be the second part of their statement, namely, that the crewmen of the Aeginetan ships had disembarked with Cleomenes. On this, Herodotus gives us no hint of an Aeginetan excuse.

We cannot know how Cleomenes compelled the cooperation of the Aeginetan ships, although Herodotus' silence and the very speed with which the Spartan king moved against Argos would appear to rule out acquiring the ships through a military engagement.<sup>38</sup> One possibility is that Cleomenes intercepted some Aeginetan merchant ships going about their business in the Gulf of Nauplia. The chief charge against the Aeginetans in the eyes of the Argives, their disembarkation with Cleomenes, would be shorthand for some active participation, in the strict sense, during the campaign's fighting.<sup>39</sup> The episode has no bearing on Aeginetan membership in the Peloponnesian League, once we realize that the Aeginetan ships were not there on official business in the first place. Perhaps it is also sensible to minimize Argive dissatisfaction with the Aeginetan excuse. The Argives may have been reluctant to help Aegina (when the latter later asked for help against the invading Athenians) out of a fear of reawakening Spartan suspicions on the subject of their military strength. In answer to the Aeginetan request, however, a force of one thousand volunteers goes out to aid the Aeginetans. It is hard to believe that Aegina could call on the services of so many genuine volunteers so soon after Sepeia. This may be an expedition sanctioned in some way by the Argive leadership, despite their official disavowal.<sup>40</sup>

#### *Cleomenes and Aegina, 491/490–489*

It is on Cleomenes' intervention on Aegina that the demonstration of Aeginetan involvement in the Peloponnesian League has often turned. This whole episode raises difficulties on many counts: its chronology in Herodotus, Spartan foreign policy, and the relationship between Cleomenes and Demaratus, to name a few.<sup>41</sup> These cannot be investigated here, but it should be suggested that this episode's importance for Spartan foreign policy has been somewhat underestimated, and that at least some of this chain of events must fall after Marathon.

Athens appealed to Sparta because the Aeginetans were said to have given tokens of submission to the envoys of the Great King.<sup>42</sup> Undoubtedly, the Athenians feared that Aegina would add her weight to the Persian assault, and perhaps offer them a base. The submission to the Persians itself argues against Aeginetan membership in the Peloponnesian League.

38. Tomlinson, *Argos and the Argolid*, p. 96.

39. Leahy, "Aegina and the Peloponnesian League," p. 234. It is unnecessary to look for reasons for the cooperation of the crews of the Aeginetan ships with Cleomenes. Déclassé elements of Aeginetan society must have had a significant role in manning the ships, military or merchant, of the large Aeginetan fleet. They would have had little commitment to upholding the official stances of the Aeginetan state toward its friends.

40. Tomlinson, *Argos and the Argolid*, pp. 100, 181. Cf. Thuc. 1. 107. 5, 5. 67, 5. 81; Diod. 12. 75. There is no reason to believe that the *douloi* would not have continued a pro-Aeginetan policy.

41. Figueira, "Aegina and Athens," pp. 274–307.

42. Hdt. 6. 49. 1, 7. 133. 1.



Contemporaneously, Sparta will put the envoys of Darius to death.<sup>43</sup> Herodotus gives us the impression that each state confronted with the question of whether or not to Medize reacted individually. Yet it strains belief that Eretria and Chalcis, for instance, close to Athens, were not in communication with Athens over what policy to take.<sup>44</sup> So it seems reasonable that Sparta and her allies were aware of each other's views on Persian aggression. Thus, Aegina could not decide to Medize without putting herself out of step with Sparta and the League. On the other hand, perhaps the key factor was the attitude of Argos toward Persia. By 491, with the memory of the debacle of Sepeia still fresh, Argos may have begun to contemplate the advantages accruing to her from a pro-Persian policy. There were those who saw in Argive behavior during the invasion of Xerxes a deeper involvement than the strict neutrality that was the city's official policy.<sup>45</sup>

The appeal to Sparta has been taken unnecessarily to mean that Athens was appealing to Sparta as Aegina's *hegemon*. Athens was unable to coerce the Aeginetans by her own strength, as the ensuing hostilities indicate.<sup>46</sup> Only the threat of military intervention by an outside power could bring the Aeginetans to comply. Such a threat is inherent in Cleomenes' behavior on his first trip to Aegina.<sup>47</sup> It may not be inappropriate to observe that the Aeginetans learned from Demaratus, the other Spartan king, how most effectively to question the legality of Cleomenes' demands. We can admit that the warner or advisor in secret communication with his state's adversary plays a dramatic role on several occasions in Herodotus. It does not alter the fact that Aeginetan resistance was predicated on Demaratus' involvement. What precisely in this involvement motivated the Aeginetans to resist Cleomenes (the information which Demaratus gave them, or merely the fact of his support) is not mentioned by Herodotus, and so can only be a subject of speculation.<sup>48</sup>

Nevertheless, trying to see the Peloponnesian League in this episode may be wrong. There is no suggestion that anyone except the Spartans was privy to or involved in the decision to move against Aegina (and some doubt

43. Beloch, *Griechische Geschichte*, 2.1:40, doubted the reality of the Persian request for submission from the Spartans and Athenians, and with it the historicity of their violence to the envoys. See R. I. Sealey, "The Pit and the Well: The Persian Heralds of 491 B.C.," *CJ* 72 (1976): 13-20, who has convincingly supported the view that this episode is correctly attributed by Herodotus.

44. See M. B. Wallace, "Herodotus and Euboea," *Phoenix* 28 (1974): 22-45, esp. 36.

45. Hdt. 7. 186.

46. Hdt. 6. 88-92. An alternative route out of this dilemma is to assume that Athens belonged to the Peloponnesian League. It should, however, be rejected (see Leahy, "Aegina and the Peloponnesian League," pp. 235-36; Wickert, *Der peloponnesische Bund*, pp. 20-23). Another approach would be that Sparta had a defensive alliance with Athens (a general *epimachia* or a special agreement to repel the expected Persian expeditionary force). Aeginetan Medism, however, which could only signify a willingness to collaborate actively with the Persians on request, would justify an Athenian appeal to Sparta (*pace* Leahy, "Aegina and the Peloponnesian League," p. 236). Another possibility, attractive given Sparta's behavior during the Marathon campaign, is that the grounds for Cleomenes' action were informal understandings between Cleomenes and his supporters and the Athenians.

47. As Cleomenes' personal threat against Carius demonstrates (Hdt. 6. 50. 3).

48. Leahy, "Aegina and the Peloponnesian League," p. 236.

whether it is not Cleomenes and his political allies rather than the Spartan government in the strict sense). While it is true that in an emergency Cleomenes may have been empowered to act on his own toward a recalcitrant ally, with a League matter involved, his natural reaction to the Aeginetan refusal to turn over hostages would have been to return with a decree or pronouncement of the collective organ of the League, and perhaps along with it representatives of allied states to attest to its authenticity.<sup>49</sup> In the event, if we accept Herodotus' estimation that Demaratus' opposition led to Cleomenes' engineering his deposition, there must have been no device ready to Cleomenes' hand but the removal of Demaratus.<sup>50</sup>

The extraction of hostages may have been involved with the privileges of the two Spartan royal houses, with each king possessing a veto power over the other in this matter. Otherwise, one king would have been able without check to commit the Spartan state to a particular line of policy by means of demanding hostages from a particular foreign city. Significantly, after the initial rebuff of Cleomenes, Herodotus turns to a discussion of the traditional rights of the two kings.<sup>51</sup>

Yet, this prerogative may have been limited in use to nonallied states, or the members of the alliance and the Spartan government would have been in a position to bring the matter to some conclusion short of the removal from office of one of the kings. There is no indication that this sort of hostage-taking was in customary use by Sparta among her allies. In this case, assuming for the moment that Aegina was a member of the Peloponnesian League, the Spartans take hostages from their ally, and deposit them in the hands of that ally's worst enemy. It is not hard to view this as a hostile act, which would terminate any alliance, if one were preexisting. Later, during the Peloponnesian War, the Spartans extract hostages from the Arcadians, but clearly with the connivance of the pro-Spartan party in their home cities. They deposit them in Orchomenos, itself an Arcadian city.<sup>52</sup>

49. Leahy, "Aegina and the Peloponnesian League," p. 235, insists that we must see in this episode a "revolt" from the League, with the League executive acting by virtue of its emergency powers. He fails to address the question of why it should be necessary to impeach a Spartan king to carry into effect a League directive. Is it necessary to imagine that Sparta's allies had recognized certain privileges of the Spartan kings independent of the public enactments of the Spartan state? Such powers would have to be imagined to be beyond the League's decision-making powers, and such authority is unattested. The readiness of the Aeginetans to capitulate after the political impotence of Demaratus had been demonstrated may help show that the important point for the critical group of Aeginetans (the "swing votes," i.e., those prepared to go back on their submission to Persia out of a fear or a consideration of Sparta) was whether Cleomenes had the unconditional backing of the Spartan authorities. The veto of one king over another in this matter was interpreted to mean that there was no such consensus.

50. It is possible that the deposition of Demaratus had been planned for this moment for some time (see H. W. Parke, "The Deposing of Spartan Kings," *CQ* 39 [1945]: 106-12).

51. Herodotus' discussion of Spartan kingship has its initial connection to the preceding narrative in the dispute between Cleomenes and Demaratus, which Herodotus links with the difference in prestige between the royal houses (6. 51-52), but soon turns to the privileges of the kings (6. 56-58).

52. Thuc. 5. 61. 4, a parallel adduced by De Ste. Croix (*Origins*, p. 334). Other parallels: 8. 3. 1, Agis extracts hostages from the Thessalians; 8. 24. 6, 31. 5, Astyochus takes hostages from the Chiot. These are too few cases to make a judgment on continuing royal prerogatives.

The language used by Herodotus to express the decision of the Aeginetans to hand over their hostages to Cleomenes and Leotychidas, who had replaced Demaratus, has been taken to suggest their recognition of a legal requirement to cooperate. The verb *δικαίω* is taken to convey this sense of legal responsibility. However, Herodotean usage scarcely indicates so exclusive a sense. At several junctures, the historian uses *δικαίω* in the sense of "deeming something fit or appropriate." Therefore, the meaning here could be that of the prudence or common sense of an action in the context of previously expressed attitudes, rather than its moral rightness.<sup>53</sup>

After the fall of Cleomenes, the Spartans were confronted by the Aeginetans, who claimed that Leotychidas was implicated in Cleomenes' acts of violence which led to the acquisition of the Aeginetan hostages.<sup>54</sup> Herodotus tells us that the Spartans condemned Leotychidas and were willing to hand him over to the Aeginetans. The specific grounds for the conviction were that Leotychidas had outraged the Aeginetans. It is hard to see how a legitimate decision of the Peloponnesian League could ever have been open to such an indictment as this.<sup>55</sup> One cannot extricate oneself from this predicament simply by stating that the ephors were hostile to Cleomenes and Leotychidas throughout the episode. If a League decision was the ultimate basis for the kings' action, the ephors could not accuse them of outrage without implicating the Spartan government itself and its allies. There were in any case three boards of ephors in office during the episode (i.e., if the trial of Leotychidas took place after Marathon). The thought that all were uniformly hostile to Leotychidas and Cleomenes demands an unlikely continuity in their views, unless one believes that the ephorate was invariably at odds with the royal houses. Nor is it reasonable to assume that the *dikasterion* mentioned by Herodotus was likely to have been merely the ephors, without at least the *gerousia* as a participant.

No similar difficulties exist if we assume that Cleomenes and Leotychidas were acting by means of the customary prerogatives of the Spartan kings,

53. Leahy, "Aegina and the Peloponnesian League," p. 236 (and also De Ste. Croix, *Origins*, p. 334) asserts that *δικαίω* with the infinitive means: a recognition of some general principle of justice (e.g., Hdt. 1. 89. 1, 2. 151. 3, 3. 148. 2), occasionally religious duties (e.g., 2. 47. 2, 4. 186. 2), or legal obligation (e.g., 6. 86. 1, 6. 82. 1). He grants a nonmoral usage (like the English "see fit to") (e.g., 2. 181. 1, where Amasis decides to marry a Cyrenaean, or 4. 154. 2, where a Cretan king decides his second wife should be a step-mother to his daughter). These latter are merely clear cases of a wider phenomenon, wherein the usage of *δικαίω* belongs to the prudential class of motivation rather than to the legal or judicial. In 8. 126. 2, Artabazus decides to reduce rebellious Potidaea; similarly, Mardonius decides to fight at Plataea because of adherence to a Persian *nomos* (9. 42. 1). But, in this case, the *nomos* appears to be nothing more than the tradition of fighting against inferior or equal enemy numbers. See also 2. 172. 5, where the Egyptians are induced to recognize Amasis as master, and 3. 19. 3, where Cambyses declines to use his Phoenician subjects against Carthage. If we insist that *δικαίω* must always have a legal meaning, it is possible to reconstruct steps to resolve such decisions into obligatory terms. Yet, such a procedure smacks of semantic apriorism. Granted that a legalistic reading is impossible in several cases, there is no reason why *δικαίω* cannot have weakened from its strong original sense of obligation. Once we admit that political attitudes and norms can justify the use of *δικαίω*, further speculation becomes fruitless, inasmuch as we have no direct evidence on the reasoning that led the Aeginetans to "deem it prudent" to give in.

54. Hdt. 6. 85. 1.

55. Leahy, "Aegina and the Peloponnesian League," pp. 237–38.

which did not need official sanction. Traditional rights are two-edged swords. A strong-willed monarch like Cleomenes might expand their application and insist upon their exercise. A weaker figure like Leotychidas, in face of a strong official reaction, may not have been able to make such a stand. One approach would be to assume that the specific grounds for Leotychidas' indictment may in fact have been that he was bribed by the Athenians. Bribery was the accusation originally thrown in the teeth of Cleomenes by the Aeginetans on his first visit to the island.<sup>56</sup>

It is difficult to understand precisely what we are to think of the Spartan willingness to deliver Leotychidas into the hands of the Aeginetans after his conviction. Certainly, the Spartans were prepared to, and did, condemn their kings, who usually fled into exile. But it is difficult to cite a parallel for the handing over of a king to a foreign state, allied or not.<sup>57</sup> Leotychidas may have been threatened with *atimia*, which would make of him an outlaw, whom the Aeginetans (or anyone else, for that matter) might drag off for punishment. This view would minimize the significance of the Aeginetan participation in the affair; in other words, they were witnesses rather than a principal party. Herodotus emphasized the Aeginetans to facilitate the introduction into his narrative of the hostilities between Athens and Aegina that follow.

Caution is advisable in this matter inasmuch as, besides the bare fact of Leotychidas' escape from punishment by going to Athens to request the return of the hostages, Herodotus tells us very little about the incident that is pertinent. Leotychidas' diplomacy in Herodotus' narrative amounts to a homily.<sup>58</sup> He makes no effort to force the Athenians to recognize that their refusal to cooperate with him might have adverse effects for them at Sparta. The Athenians react by echoing the Aeginetans' refusal to render up the hostages when only one king of the two has requested them.<sup>59</sup> The Spartans are content to leave the matter at that, with the Aeginetans left to take their own steps to get back the hostages.<sup>60</sup>

It may be justifiable to believe that belated Spartan solicitude for an ally prompted their willingness to punish Leotychidas. On the other hand, it is difficult to see why a serious attempt at restitution for a wronged ally

56. Hdt. 6. 50. 2.

57. Spartan kings in exile: Leotychidas, at Tegea (Hdt. 6. 72. 2); Cleomenes, in flight to Thessaly or Sellasia (Hdt. 6. 74. 1; D. Hereward, "Herodotus VI.74," *CR* n.s. 1 [1951]: 146); Pleistoanax, at Lepreon (Thuc. 5. 16. 3); Pausanias, at Tegea (Xen. *Hell.* 3. 5. 22). These examples raise the question of why Leotychidas was so foolish as to fail to forestall punishment in the matter of the Aeginetan hostages by flight.

58. Hdt. 6. 88. Leotychidas' remarks are exhausted by the story of the bad faith of Glaucus of Sparta, who stole funds left in his keeping by a guest-friend, and are meant to provide the Athenians with a chilling example of the requital given to the faithless. Significantly, Glaucus misappropriates what is given to him by a *xenos*, and this suggests that Sparta or Cleomenes' clique and the Athenians may have conceptualized their cooperation against the Persians in 491/90 in terms of a merely *xenia*-type relationship, rather than a *summachia*. See H. W. Stubbs, "The Speech of Leotychidas in Herodotus 6. 86," reported in *PCA* 66 (1959): 27-28.

59. Herodotus' term for the Athenian refusal is a *prophasis*, the same word used for the justification of Athens' appeal to Sparta. It does not denote the truth or falsity of the reason stated, but merely that it is self-interested. See H. R. Rawlings, *A Semantic Study of "Prophasis" to 400 B.C.*, Hermes Einzelschriften 33 (Wiesbaden, 1975), pp. 14-21, 25-33.

60. Hdt. 6. 87.

might not have been somewhat more forceful. It remains a possibility that the disgrace with which Leotychidas' career ended may have moved Herodotus or his informants to put the king's efforts to recover the hostages in the worst possible light. Did Leotychidas merely go to Athens to remind the Athenians that they were behaving ungratefully in retaining their prisoners after the Persian danger, the reason for their deposit, had passed? This remains a very complex and disturbing stretch of Herodotean narrative.

After Leotychidas' failure, hostilities began between Athens and Aegina. The actual fighting included an attempt by the Athenians to overthrow the island's reigning oligarchy. When this failed, the fugitive Aeginetan democrats were established in Attica to carry on piracy against their homeland.<sup>61</sup> During the preliminaries to the Athenian intervention in support of these Aeginetans, the Athenians discovered that they did not have enough "battle-worthy" ships and were compelled to acquire twenty ships from Corinth by nominal sale.<sup>62</sup> While it is possible that two members of the Peloponnesian League might be at war with each other, with the Spartans remaining aloof because they judged that the claims of the two allies negated each other, this is not the case here. Corinth was at most a minor party in the military action taken by Athens against Aegina, an ally of Sparta, we are to believe.<sup>63</sup> In this case, we must also believe that Sparta was prepared to countenance aid by her ally, Corinth, to Athens so that this outsider to the League might attempt to subjugate another League member, Aegina.

Moreover, are we also to believe that Sparta was disinterested in the Athenian effort to put the demos in power on Aegina? Sparta has always been supposed to have supported oligarchies among her allies, if only to insure the loyalty to Sparta of the local aristocracies.<sup>64</sup> Yet it is not to Sparta that Aegina applied for help at this point, but to Argos. Although the Argives refused official help, one thousand volunteers went out to the island. The Aeginetan plea is surprising, if Aegina was an ally of Sparta.

A means out of this predicament is to follow A. Andrewes in his hypothesis that Herodotus confused two wars in this passage.<sup>65</sup> The Nicodromus coup, and with it the Corinthian sale of ships of Athens and Argive aid to Aegina, belonged to a conflict to be dated to 493. Based on this interpretation, D. M. Leahy advances the possibility that Aegina was not a member of the League in 493, but had become one by 491, joining the League when Argos proved an undependable protector, and Sparta had shown her might so dramatically at Sepeia.<sup>66</sup> Fear of an involvement of the Peloponnesian League in the war with Aegina induced the Athenians to allow hostilities to peter out.

The case for a redating of the Nicodromus coup to 493 is hardly over-

61. Hdt. 6. 87-90.

62. Hdt. 6. 89.

63. Leahy, "Aegina and the Peloponnesian League," p. 238.

64. De Ste. Croix, *Origins*, pp. 99-100; Leahy, "Aegina and the Peloponnesian League," pp. 240-41. Cf. Thuc. 1. 76. 1.

65. Andrewes, "Athens and Aegina," pp. 2-7.

66. Leahy, "Aegina and the Peloponnesian League," p. 239.

whelming, and serious arguments can be brought against it.<sup>67</sup> In any case, if Aegina were a recent joiner of the Spartan alliance, her Medism would seem all the more curious. Also, Athens was at war, or on the brink of war, with Aegina from Marathon down to the foundation of the Hellenic League, without a hint in Herodotus of an anticipated Spartan intervention. Leahy's view that Athens was readier to take this risk after 490 because such an action would have been a very different matter from the prospect of an unexpected and unprovided for intervention is without point. With the reasonable expectation of another attempt against Greece by the Persians, and with Spartan cooperation so vital in this event, Athens could not afford to behave provocatively toward the Peloponnesian League.

### *Athens and Aegina in the 480s*

That a state of tension, if not outright confrontation, between Athens and Aegina existed in the 480s is implicit in Herodotus' account of Themistocles' legislation on the navy. The latter argued for his naval program on the grounds of the usefulness of the ships against Aegina.<sup>68</sup> This situation, perhaps marked by intermittent warfare, can hardly be reconciled with Aeginetan membership in the Peloponnesian League. It is equally difficult to understand against the background of the record of Sparta's cooperation with Athens. Even if clauses of the treaties of the members of the Peloponnesian League with Sparta established the necessity for mutual consultation before aggressive measures, Sparta could hardly have put Aegina off repeatedly without Aeginetan membership in the Peloponnesian League lapsing.

### III. THE GROWTH OF THE PELOPONNESIAN LEAGUE

The allies with whom it is reasonable to assume that Sparta had ties by the early fifth century fall into two main categories: (1) neighboring states such as Tegea, Sparta's earliest ally, and the other Arcadian cities, whose role was that of buffer states to Laconia and Messenia; (2) states such as Corinth and Sicyon, who had previously been ruled by tyrants. Sparta had perhaps adopted an antityrannical stance to gain the adherence of this second group, which in the case of Corinth and Sicyon had reason to fear Sparta's old adversary, Argos. Aegina was not close to Sparta; nor does tyranny, and the instability attendant on it, seem to have troubled Aegina in the sixth century.

The extent to which the Spartans were willing to take on permanent allies far afield is indicated by two events. In 519 (or, if we emend Thucydides' text, in 509), Cleomenes refused Plataea's offer of alliance, because this city was too far away for a Spartan alliance to be of any value to it.<sup>69</sup> Also, at least once, the Spartans sent an expeditionary force to the Cyclades,

67. Figueira, "Aegina and Athens," pp. 284-96.

68. Hdt. 7. 144. 1.

69. See n. 24.

but made no allies there. They expelled Lygdamis, tyrant of Naxos, but, as far as we know, Naxos never joined the Peloponnesian League.<sup>70</sup>

The most probable time for the admission to the Spartan alliance of the small states of the Argolid and Argolic Acte is after the Battle of Sepeia, when, for the first time, Argos was truly humbled by Sparta.<sup>71</sup> These states, to whom Argos always represented the first danger, should have begun to look to Sparta for aid about this time. There is a temptation to put Aegina among these states, except for several considerations. Once Aegina had grown to be a naval power, the island no longer needed to fear an alliance with Argos as having a potential for gradual subjugation. Argos was never a naval power in this period. Rather, Argos, whose hoplite military strength complemented Aegina's naval capability, may have appeared the ideal ally against larger neighbors such as Corinth and Athens. There was little that Sparta could do to aid Aegina that could not also be provided by Argos, namely, modest reinforcements on land. But more important, in this period, when Spartan influence was spreading along the southern and western shores of the Saronic Gulf, in the 490s and 480s, Athens, Aegina's enemy, became much more desirable to Sparta as a friend, because of the growing Persian menace.

The role of Corinth in the Peloponnesian League deserves some attention regarding Aegina. Herodotus reports to us a single incident—the debate over restoring Hippias at Athens—that gives us a picture of the internal workings of the Peloponnesian League.<sup>72</sup> Here, Corinth seems to have had a dominant voice among Sparta's allies. Because of her wealth and naval strength, Corinth was always in a position to play a most independent role in the alliance.<sup>73</sup> The question remains whether Corinth could have played this role early in the fifth century had Aegina, another wealthy naval power, been a member of the League. Corinth can be seen as hostile to Aegina from the sale of Corinthian ships to Athens for use against the island.<sup>74</sup> It is doubtful that Corinth would have encouraged Aeginetan participation in the alliance, or that Sparta could have brought these two unfriendly neighbors under the same political tent.

A further consideration on the subject of Aeginetan membership in the Peloponnesian League concerns the origins of the Hellenic League against Persia. It could be argued that the Hellenic League had its genesis in two related needs: (1) to bring under Spartan leadership those states who would not accept permanent Spartan hegemony; (2) to bring together those states who could only unite temporarily in cooperation, and whose long-term interests were incompatible. Athens was certainly among the states to whom

70. Plut. *Mor.* 859B. On the date of 525, see H. W. Parke, "Polycrates and Delos," *CQ* 40 (1946): 105–8; for 516, during Sparta's brief thalassocracy, see W. G. Forrest, "Two Chronographic Notes," *CQ* 23 (1969): 95–110, esp. 105.

71. Wickert, *Der peloponnesische Bund*, pp. 56–61; Busolt, *Die Lakedaimonier und ihre Bundesgenossen* (Leipzig, 1878), pp. 75–82.

72. Hdt. 5. 92–93.

73. At the beginning of the Peloponnesian War, e.g., Thuc. 1. 68–89; machinations after the Peace of Nicias: Thuc. 5. 38–39. 1.

74. Hdt. 6. 89.

the first requirement was pertinent. Similarly, Argos, against whom the Peloponnesian League was in a large part aimed, was the target of an appeal to join the Hellenic League. Perhaps Aegina was another state to whom permanent acceptance of Spartan hegemony was irksome, while alliance only for the purpose of repelling the Persians was an attractive alternative.<sup>75</sup>

The reconciliation of Athens and Aegina, which Herodotus stressed as an early significant accomplishment of the League, bespeaks the second of these needs.<sup>76</sup> If Aegina was a member of the Peloponnesian League, accepting the authority of Sparta and her allies in foreign policy, would this reconciliation have loomed so large either on the agenda of the Hellenic League or in the mind of its historian? Would not the decision of Sparta and her allies to enter into cooperation with Athens have of itself implemented a reconciliation of all the outstanding quarrels between individual League members and Athens?

In summation, there seems to be no firm reason to believe that Aegina belonged to the Peloponnesian League before 480. The hypothesis of a membership provides a framework for understanding Aeginetan history in this period that is not easily accommodated with events, unless the very concept of participation in the League is so stripped of meaning as to be of historical disinterest.

#### IV. AEGINA AND THE PELOPONNESIAN LEAGUE AFTER 480

##### *Spartan and Aeginetan Attitudes*

In the period after 480, the perspective from which the problem of Aeginetan membership in the Peloponnesian League should be viewed has changed. The Aeginetans should have recognized the greatly augmented strength of Athens. At first glance, it might be thought that this threat had become so clear that the Aeginetans would seek Spartan protection. Such a view, however, depends on an interpretation which sees the Spartans as willing to take on a defensive responsibility which demanded a naval capability that, from the 470s onward, they no longer possessed. True, Sparta retained her partnership with Corinth, and thereby the support of Corinth's substantial naval power. There may have been doubts (subsequently validated by Cecryphaleia), however, whether Corinth could use her fleet to any effect in the Saronic Gulf, so close to the Peiraeus. In addition, our judgment on Spartan readiness to accept Aegina depends on an appraisal of Spartan suspicion of Athens that has an early anticipation of an inevitable struggle with the Athenians, wherein Aeginetan aid might be valuable. Spartan anxiety stemming from the growing strength of Athens grew more slowly

75. The editors of the *ATL* (3:95-100) wish to see on the Serpent Column (R. Meiggs and D. Lewis, *A Selection of Greek Historical Inscriptions* [Oxford, 1969], no. 27), set up to commemorate the Greek victories over Persia, three sub-groups headed by Athens, Sparta, and Corinth. Accordingly, Aegina was listed under Sparta. The organization of material is scarcely systematic enough to warrant such conclusions. See P. A. Brunt, "The Hellenic League against Persia," *Historia* 2 (1953-54): 153-63; Meiggs-Lewis, *GHI*, no. 27; MacDowell, "Aegina and the Delian League," p. 119.

76. Hdt. 7. 145. 1.



than this.<sup>77</sup> Without the influence of this fear, Spartan encouragement of an Aeginetan application to the Peloponnesian League may have been thought to be unduly provocative to Athens, a declaration of Spartan distrust. That Sparta was unwilling to do this is witnessed by the failure to press the issue of prohibiting the rebuilding of Athens' walls, and by the reluctance to give Pausanias any overt support.

Assuming for the moment that the Spartans were willing to welcome the Aeginetans into their alliance, reasons can also be brought forward to explain Aeginetan neutrality. First of all, there is the question of what Sparta can be imagined to have done to encourage so trusting an attitude in the Aeginetans as to prompt their risking an affiliation with the Peloponnesian League, which could only be a proclamation that Aegina anticipated trouble with Athens. It should have been obvious to the Aeginetans that the great fleet of Athens, built from the revenues of Laurium, would have represented a deadly threat to Aegina if it had been used against the island as planned. The Persian invasion and Aegina's adherence to the Hellenic League warded off this immediate threat. It may then have seemed that safety in the years following Salamis may have been best sought not by appeals to Sparta, which could do little to aid Aegina, but by a dependence on the mutual guarantees established by the Hellenic League.<sup>78</sup>

The Aeginetans would have been reassured by the absorption of Athenian energies in the war against Persia, and with a concomitant neglect of the old local disputes with Thebes, Megara, and Aegina. The Aeginetans may also have expected that Athens would not remain on the whole so successful against Persia, as she did before overreaching herself in Cyprus and in the Egyptian campaign. In the absence of explicit source material, any discussion of Aeginetan policy and Spartan attitudes toward Aegina is hypothetical. Such speculation, however, does show that chains of reasoning can be set up to explain Aeginetan neutrality should our investigation of specific episodes show no signs of Aeginetan membership in the Peloponnesian League.

### *The Foundation of the Delian League*

Although one might think that mention would be made of the Aeginetans when Athens replaced Sparta as the leader in the struggle against Persia, our sources serve us badly in this regard. The first signs of a breakdown of the Hellenic League as an active force can be seen in the retirement of the Spartans in 479, leaving the Athenians to besiege Sestos. Herodotus says

77. We may disregard Diod. 11. 50. 3–8, where the Spartans, eager for war with Athens in 475/74, are stopped by Hetoimaridas, a *geron*. H. D. Meyer, "Vorgeschichte und Gründung des delisch-attischen Seebundes," *Historia* 12 (1963): 405–46, esp. 433–35, thinks this account to be anachronistic. Yet, Diodorus relates some details on Peloponnesian history that may go back to Charon of Lampsacus (see D. M. Lewis, "Ithome Again," *Historia* 2 [1953–54]: 412–18). The Spartan decision to contest the naval hegemony with Athens was a sudden flareup, as suddenly quieted by Hetoimaridas' intervention. Thucydides' silence and his emphasis on the slow growth of Spartan fear of Athens shows that the momentary enthusiasm for war left no permanent impression on the Spartan majority. Nor did the episode affect Aegina's plans, as it was too fleeting, and was probably not common knowledge until much later.

78. See pp. 21–22

only that the Spartans, with the Peloponnesians, chose to withdraw, and that the Athenians remained to besiege Sestos.<sup>79</sup> That we should not interpret Herodotus to mean that the Peloponnesian League as such withdrew, leaving the Athenians (not being members of the League) at Sestos, can perhaps be reasoned from the accounts of Diodorus and Thucydides.<sup>80</sup> Both report Ionians and islanders remaining to aid the Athenians. This venture appears to be the first sign of collaboration among the members of the future Delian League. No members of the Hellenic League from the mainland states, whether members of the Peloponnesian League or not, need to be thought to have participated. In trying to determine the Aeginetan attitude toward the allied defection from Pausanias' leadership, we are hampered by the uncertainty over the very presence of an Aeginetan contingent in the fleet. Pausanias had twenty ships from the Peloponnesus, and thirty from Athens, as well as a great number of allies of indeterminate origin.<sup>81</sup> The fleet is smaller than we might expect, unless the other allies provided a considerable force. The contingent from the Peloponnesus is also quite small, if Sparta, Corinth, and Aegina are all thought to be contributing. It may be possible that the Aeginetans were among the other allies, if they contributed at all. Thucydides tells us that all deserted the Spartans except the soldiers from the Peloponnesus. Since he usually employs the term "Peloponnesus" as strictly geographical, while the term "Peloponnesians" is often used for members of the Spartan alliance, no inference about Aegina should be drawn from his language.<sup>82</sup> Diodorus adds the detail that some Peloponnesians deserted Pausanias, returning home and sending embassies to Sparta.<sup>83</sup> None of these accounts is specific enough to give us any solid evidence about Aeginetan affiliations in this period.

### *The Embassy of Polyarchus and the Helot Revolt*

An Aeginetan, Polyarchus, came to Sparta bearing the information that the Athenians were rebuilding their walls.<sup>84</sup> This could be thought to suggest that Aegina had joined the Spartan alliance.<sup>85</sup> The weakness of this point becomes clear when one considers the lack of feasible alternatives for the recipient of the Aeginetan imputation. Sparta was the *hegemon* of the Hellenic League. While at Thucydides' urging we may suspect Sparta's good faith in attempting to prevent the refortification, the fact remains that, nominally (and, one might add, publicly), Spartan behavior on this subject was predicated on pan-Hellenic interest, the danger of Persian use

79. Hdt. 9. 114.

80. Thuc. 1. 89; Diod. 11. 37. 4.

81. Thuc. 1. 94. 1.

82. Thuc. 1. 95. 4. See De Ste. Croix, *Origins*, pp. 108, 188; A. W. Gomme, *A Historical Commentary to Thucydides*, vol. 4 (Oxford, 1956), p. 249; cf. Meiggs, *Athenian Empire*, pp. 51–52.

83. Diod. 11. 43. 3.

84. Plut. *Them.* 19. 2; MacDowell, "Aegina and the Delian League," p. 119, does not see Polyarchus as an official Aeginetan envoy. De Ste. Croix, *Origins*, p. 334, has pointed out that ἀποστέλλω is regularly used in Plutarch for sending out an envoy.

85. De Ste. Croix, *Origins*, pp. 334–35.

of extra-Isthmian fortifications.<sup>86</sup> It does not appear possible to draw any conclusion from this about Aeginetan membership in the Peloponnesian League.

Regarding Aeginetan aid to Sparta during the Helot Revolt as an indication of League membership, a similar difficulty is at issue.<sup>87</sup> Sparta called on Athens to help her, presumably under the terms of the Hellenic League, which was still held to be in existence.<sup>88</sup> There is no reason why Aeginetan aid to Sparta should not fall under this same category of responsibilities of members of the Hellenic League toward Sparta. It is possible that the treaty or treaties establishing the Hellenic League specifically legislated for Sparta's calling on her allies in the event of a Helot revolt.<sup>89</sup> Thucydides informs us that, in part, the Spartans were ready to establish the Aeginetans, who had been driven from their island at the beginning of the Peloponnesian War by the Athenians, in Cynouria, because of their help to Sparta during the Revolt. This, along with Thucydides' use of the terms *εὐεργέτης*/*εὐεργεσία* to describe the Aeginetan service to Sparta, suggests a special gratitude on the part of the Spartans, one not simply based on a service owed to them by a member of the Peloponnesian League.<sup>90</sup> That Aeginetan service rather than Spartan guilt over the supposed abandonment of the island by Sparta in the Thirty Years Peace is the Spartans' explicit motivation suggests that Aegina was never truly a Spartan ally.

### *The First Peloponnesian War*

Aegina is not mentioned in the early fighting of the so-called "First Peloponnesian War." On one interpretation of the admittedly abbreviated narrative of Thucydides' *Pentekontaeteia*, the Athenian war with Aegina only broke out after the Battle of Cecryphaleia. As is well known, the chronology of this period in Thucydides is filled with difficulties in interpretation. In this case, the problem lies in an understanding of his word order: *πολέμου δὲ καταστάντος πρὸς Αἰγινήτας Ἀθηναίοις μετὰ ταῦτα ναυμαχία γίγνεται ἐπ' Αἰγίνῃ μεγάλη Ἀθηναίων καὶ Αἰγινήων* . . . . The very fact that Thucydides thought it necessary to inform us that war had broken out between Athens and

86. Thuc. 1. 90. 1-2.

87. Thuc. 2. 27. 2. See MacDowell, "Aegina and the Delian League," p. 119.

88. Thuc. 1. 102. 1-2; Plut. *Cimon* 16. 8.

89. De Ste. Croix, *Origins*, p. 113, believes Sparta had the right to call out her Peloponnesian allies immediately if the Helots revolted. On the analogy of the alliance between Athens and Sparta in 421/20 (Thuc. 5. 23. 3), it is possible that a similar stipulation was inserted into the agreements of the Hellenic League, since Sparta's ability to operate outside the Peloponnesus depended upon the Helots remaining quiet. Thus, Athens, Plataea, and Aegina come to Sparta's aid. But see note 90, in which case, treaty obligations would be in the background.

90. The Aeginetans are *εὐεργεταί* in Thuc. 2. 27, and their *εὐεργεσία* is mentioned in 4. 56. 2. A parallel is 1. 32. 1, where the Corcyraean speaker concedes that there had been "neither alliance nor benefaction" preexisting between Athens and Corcyra. The Corinthian in 1. 41. 2 recalls Corinthian services to Athens, when Corinth dissuaded the Peloponnesians from aiding Samos. There can be no alliance here. Generally, Thucydidean usage suggests a special, almost gratuitous service, to be rewarded with gratitude. Seldom are these terms used of allies, as in the speeches of Brasidas (4. 11. 4) and Diodotus (3. 47. 3), and in these the tone is rhetorical. The speakers are at pains to magnify the friendly services of the parties described as the benefactors.

Aegina may in itself suggest that the Aeginetans were not members of the Peloponnesian League. Otherwise, they might have been assumed to have been at war with Athens from the outbreak of hostilities with the Peloponnesians. At any rate, the narrative could suggest that only after Cecryphaleia did war break out between Athens and Aegina, if we take *μετὰ ταῦτα* as going with the initial genitive absolute or with the whole sentence.<sup>91</sup>

This interpretation may be borne out by Diodorus, who may be following Thucydides in one passage (9. 78. 3–4). If so, he interpreted him to mean that the Athenians decided to go to war with the Aeginetans after Cecryphaleia. The difficulty lies in that this passage is a doublet.<sup>92</sup> Diodorus had previously described military action against Aegina under the year 464/463 (a date which in any case is impossibly early), and perhaps was basing himself on Ephorus. Here the Aeginetans provoke the confrontation by a revolt from Athens. D. M. MacDowell has tried to redeem the credit of Diodorus in this passage by pointing out that he uses parallel language to describe the revolt of Thasos.<sup>93</sup> Hence, his source must have used a similar set of phrases in referring to both Thasos and Aegina. Diodorus' two passages on Aegina, however, echo each other, which suggests that the wording is in a large part his own. The mention of a war rather than a revolt in Thucydides should be trusted, as this historian is not so terse that he could not be charged with a serious lapse if he had transposed war for revolt, especially as regards an issue so sensitive as Athenian treatment of Aegina.

In other words, the Aeginetans initially made no move to aid Sparta's allies against Athens. According to this chronology, the beginning of the war can be assigned plausibly to either Athens or Aegina. Perhaps the Athenians, recognizing that the navies of Corinth and her allies had been badly weakened at Cecryphaleia, turned on the Aeginetans, who could expect little help from that quarter. Equally, it is possible that the fighting at Cecryphaleia, an island near to Aegina, was menacing enough to the Aeginetans as to suggest their intervention. Deliberately or not, Aegina found herself fighting on the side of Corinth and her allies. However, this

91. Thuc. 1. 105. 2. Few commentators have discussed this passage, and two who do, A. Maddalena (1952) and Classen-Steup<sup>7</sup> (1866), put the outbreak of the war with Aegina after Cecryphaleia. The other tradition, which would put a comma after *Ἀθηναίους*, and take *μετὰ ταῦτα* with the main clause of the sentence, goes back to Poppe-Haack (1838). If Thucydides meant to put the war's outbreak after Cecryphaleia, it is unfortunate that he did not give *μετὰ ταῦτα* the place at the beginning of the sentence that it holds elsewhere in the *Pentekontaetia*. Most of the translators put the outbreak of the war after Cecryphaleia: W. Smith (1844); R. Crawley (1876); B. Jowett (1881); C. F. Smith (1928); R. Warner (1954). The Budé translation (1953) of J. de Romilly is careful to construe *μετὰ ταῦτα* with the main verb alone, and to have the genitive absolute expressing simple priority to the main verb, as it must.

92. Meiggs, *Athenian Empire*, pp. 447–58, esp. 455. To Meiggs, Diodorus has drawn on Ephorus for one member of the doublet in a garbled fashion, while reporting Thucydides' account correctly for the other.

93. MacDowell, "Aegina and the Delian League," pp. 120–21, would have Aegina, desirous because of her eastern trade of driving the Persians back, joining the Delian League. Assuming that so integral a connection between commerce and the creation of foreign policy can be admitted, would not Aeginetan trade have benefited most from peace, no matter who had the advantage? The picture of Aeginetan trade oriented solely toward the East may be without a factual basis, as the Sostratus inscription would indicate. See A. J. Johnston, "The Rehabilitation of Sostratus," *Parola del Passato* 27 (1972): 416–23.

does not in itself indicate membership in the Peloponnesian League—any more than for Thasos and Mytilene, who found themselves forced toward Sparta against Athens—and certainly has no bearing on previous membership.

A realization that the Athenians had taken on the League fleet and the Aeginetan fleet separately and successively may contribute to putting the Athenian accomplishment in its proper perspective. Even if we take a minimizing estimate of the continuing Athenian naval commitment in Egypt (and it is by no means certain that we should do so), it would be difficult to credit Athens with enough ships to defeat handily the combined Aeginetan and Peloponnesian fleets.<sup>94</sup> The Athenian success is of more manageable proportions when it is recognized that at Cecryphaleia the Aeginetan fleet was absent.

Another matter that bears on Aeginetan affiliation in the mid-fifth century concerns the terms of the Thirty Years Peace. It has been suggested that a special clause existed in the Peace guaranteeing autonomy to Aegina.<sup>95</sup> Such a clause has been seen as a sop to Sparta's abandonment of her ally.<sup>96</sup> The argument for the existence of this clause depends on the passages in Thucydides involving the events leading up to the Peloponnesian War. Thucydides informs us that the Aeginetans sent envoys in secret to Sparta to complain that they were not being given the autonomy due to them by treaty.<sup>97</sup> In and of itself, the Aeginetan appeal should not trouble us. Athenian allies such as Thasos, which had no prior alliance with Sparta, alike appeal to her.<sup>98</sup> There was no one else to appeal to.

If such a clause existed in the Thirty Years Peace, it is generally agreed that it could not have had much substance.<sup>99</sup> No Athenian document or literary source offers any sign of special treatment accorded to the Aeginetans on the grounds of the Thirty Years Peace. Moreover, it is difficult to see how Aegina, without fortifications or a fleet (minimum criteria used to establish the autonomy of the more independent allies of Athens: Samos,

94. Neither the literal approach (based on Thuc. 1. 104, 109–10) (two hundred ships lost) nor the minimizing approach (ninety to one hundred ships lost) is satisfactory (for the former, see J. Libourel, "The Athenian Disaster in Egypt," *AJP* 92 [1971]: 105–16; for the latter, see P. Salmon, *La politique égyptienne d'Athènes* [Brussels, 1965], pp. 157–58). The Athenian losses in Egypt can only be estimated, and their impact depends on estimates for total Athenian and League strength. It is unlikely that an Athenian fleet of more than 150 triremes could have been available in the Saronic Gulf, when we consider the fleet sizes of the Peloponnesian War. The Corinthians collected seventy-five ships (Thuc. 1. 29. 1) and eighty-six ships, in a total fleet of 150 (Thuc. 1. 46. 1), against Corcyra. The Aeginetans had seventy ships ca. 490, at least fifty ships in the year of Salamis, and the seventy ships captured in the final battle with Athens indicate that Athens' opponents had a large fleet. Yet Athens was sufficiently strong to manage this fleet handily. It may be that Corinth and her allies were too weak after Cecryphaleia to give much support to Aegina. The *epikouroi* dispatched to Aegina by Corinth and Epidaurus, and the Corinthian diversion in the Megarid, were measures taken on land to compensate for a weakness at sea.

95. *ATL* 3:303 and n. 11, 320.

96. Gomme, *Commentary*, 1:225–26.

97. Thuc. 1. 67. 2, 1. 39. 1.

98. Thasos: Thuc. 1. 101. 1; or perhaps Samos: 1. 40. 5, 41. 2, 43. 1.

99. P. A. Brunt, "The Megarian Decree," *AJP* 72 (1951): 269–82; D. Kagan, *The Outbreak of the Peloponnesian War* (Ithaca, 1967), p. 258.

Lesbos, Chios), could possibly have been considered autonomous.<sup>100</sup> The fortifications and harbor facilities of Aegina show damage that is suggestive of systematic demolition rather than simply the destruction attendant upon hostilities themselves. There is no external evidence concerning the date for this devastation, but it seems probable that it is to be connected with the Athenian conquest of Aegina.<sup>101</sup> The scale of this destruction ill fits any grant of autonomy, if we judge such a grant a concession to allow the Aeginetans a residual defensive capability. It is not surprising, then, that there is no hint in Thucydides that the Athenians met any resistance in expelling the Aeginetans from their island in 431.<sup>102</sup> It is clear that when it came to Aegina, the Athenians were not prepared to settle for a symbolic breach of the walls.

The Athenians treated the Aeginetan appeal to Sparta as a substantive cause of the conflict.<sup>103</sup> There is nothing in accounts of the war indicating that the Athenians provoked the appeal by an infringement of the Peace. Even in Aristophanes, where such a charge might have found its place beside the Megarian Decree(s) in the dispute over the causation of the War, there is not a whisper of this. To give substance to the Aeginetan charges is to convict Thucydides of serious omission. He presents Pericles as acting in confidence in regard to Athens' noninfringement of the Thirty Years Peace, and as treating the Spartan demand that Aegina be allowed its autonomy as merely rhetoric.<sup>104</sup>

When Plataea capitulated to Sparta in 427, the Plataeans based their plea before the Spartan judges on their membership in the Hellenic League, as well as both on the fact that they honored Spartan dead buried in their territory and perhaps on guarantees sworn after the battle.<sup>105</sup> The Plataeans, like the Athenians and Aeginetans, had done service to Sparta during the Helot Revolt, presumably under the terms of the anti-Persian alliance. The Theban speaker, encouraging the Spartans to take drastic measures

100. De Ste. Croix, *Origins*, pp. 293–94, believes that the *autonomia* referred to in Thuc. 1. 67 was guaranteed by the Thirty Years Peace, which may have had a general clause guaranteeing the autonomy of the allies on both sides. To him, this is a Spartan compensation for the relinquishment of her ally, Aegina. While such a clause could be argued from a known Aeginetan membership in the League, one cannot argue from the mere possibility of an autonomy clause to Aeginetan membership.

101. See P. Knoblauch, "Die Hafenanlagen der Stadt Ägina," *AD 27A'* (1972): 50–85.

102. Thuc. 2. 27. 1.

103. Thuc. 2. 27. 1.

104. Thuc. 1. 140. 3. It seems safe now to disregard *IG*, 1<sup>2</sup>. 18 on Aeginetan autonomy. The garrison of the inscription was thought to be connected with the terms of either the Aeginetan capitulation to Athens or the Thirty Years Peace. See A. S. Nease, "Garrisons in the Athenian Empire," *Phoenix* 3 (1949): 102–11; D. M. Lewis, "Notes on Attic Inscriptions," *BSA* 49 (1954): 17–50, esp. 22–25. H. B. Mattingly, "Athens and Aegina," *Historia* 16 (1967): 1–5, dating it to the eve of the Peloponnesian War, saw the garrison as the specific infringement of autonomy complained of to Sparta. Lewis argued strongly against this date. There is now considerable doubt whether the inscription is to be connected with Aegina (H. B. Mattingly, "Athens and Aegina: A Palinode," *Historia* 26 [1977]: 370–73). Dated to the time of Aeginetan capitulation, or to the Thirty Years Peace, the inscription would be prior or contemporaneous to any guarantee of autonomy in the Thirty Years Peace, and thus irrelevant to the autonomy question, unless we assume that any garrison must preclude autonomy.

105. Thuc. 3. 53–59.

against Plataea and arguing the Theban claim to Plataean territory, is put in a delicate position by Thebes' conspicuous service to the Persian cause. The Theban tries to undermine the Plataean claim as a member of the Hellenic League by pointing out that Plataea had violated the terms of the alliance by collaborating in the conquest of Aegina, and of other unnamed allies.<sup>106</sup> Would the Theban, at pains to win his point with Sparta, have referred thus to Aegina, if the Spartans had betrayed an alliance with her as a member of the Peloponnesian League? The emphasis here is on Aegina as a member of the Hellenic League, suggesting that Sparta, justifying aggression against Athens by proclaiming an espousal of liberty for the Greek cities, may have made something of an Athenian betrayal of the oaths of the Hellenic League in the subjugation of Aegina.

## V. CONCLUSIONS

An attempt has been made here to make the best possible case against the membership of Aegina in the Peloponnesian League. The view is justified from our consideration of the evidence, which, however, is too lacunose to permit certainty. Accepting that Aegina was never a member of the Peloponnesian League, what are the conclusions and questions for future consideration which we can draw? (1) As it had no obvious legal standing in the rights of the *hegemon* of the Peloponnesian League, Spartan intervention on Aegina in 491/90 deserves emphasis in explaining the direction of Spartan foreign policy. Such a decisive action should lead to speculation concerning the intensity of Sparta's commitment to an anti-Persian policy. This, then, raises the question of what factors (e.g., the existence of a faction seeking a rapprochement with Persia) kept Sparta from taking more effective steps to meet the Persian danger in the 490s. (2) The eventual conflict of two power blocs may not have been seen ahead as clearly as some would have it. Aegina, as late as the 460s, could continue on an independent policy course, hoping to stand aloof from both alliances. (3) There has been a tendency to treat the Argive alliances with Athens as a foreordained result of hostility toward Sparta. Argos' Medism and her attempt to create an independent power bloc after the Peace of Nicias should not be seen as aberrations. That Aegina appealed to Argos as late as the early 480s for help against Athens may indicate that Aeginetan independence in policy was related to Argos' foreign policy. The darkness in which Argos is shrouded in the early years of the *Pentekontaeteia* makes it difficult to come to firm conclusions on this. Athens' decision to attack Aegina may not be unrelated to her alliance with Argos. The Athenians may only have been willing to attack Aegina (if they in fact did so) when two preconditions had been met: Corinth had been weakened, and the previous relationship of Argos with Aegina was no longer a factor.<sup>107</sup> (4) If Aegina was not a member of the Peloponnesian League, Spartan concessions to Athens in the Thirty Years

106. Thuc. 3. 64. 3.

107. Argos' independent policy line is shown by the inscription where she plays an important role in an agreement with Cnossos and Tylissos (Meiggs-Lewis, *GHI*, no. 42).

Peace take on a much more limited extent. Sparta handed over to Athens no ally. She allowed the Athenians to recover Euboea, in revolt from the Delian League. Yet, she not only recovered those of her allies in Athenian hands (Troezen, Nisaea, and Pegae, the latter two dependencies of Megara), but also curbed Athenian pretensions toward building up an alliance in mainland Greece.<sup>108</sup>

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